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A recent Supreme Court of Canada decision about the constitutionality of maternity 
andparental beneJits made some important statements about the role of the state and 
our collective responsibility for the work of bearing and raising children. The 
challenge for-minists is how to buildon the court's recognition ofsubstantiveeguality 
when the very system that was aflrmed by theirjudgment is one that many agree is 
the wrongsystem for delivering maternity andparentaldenejts. This article reviews 
the histo ry of maternity andparental ben& as wellas theproblems associated with 
the current model and outlines the highlights of the Supreme Court decision. I t  
concludes with a reyection on where such progress leaves us i f i t  is apositive step in 
the wrong direction. 
Twenty years after the coming into force of the Charter equality guarantee the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recently breathed new life into the concept of 
substantive equality as it pertains to bearing and caring for children.' We could 
even look at this decision as coming full circle, back to the place where the Court 
first pronounced in 1989 that "those who bear children and benefit society as 
a whole thereby should not be economically or socially disadvantaged.. . ."2 
Now, in 2005, the Court unanimously recognized the economic costs of 
motherwork and stepped away from the current tendency to reprivatize 
women's social reproductive labour and upheld the power of the federal 
government to provide maternity and parental benefits as part of the Employ- 
ment Insurance scheme. In this short note I will briefly outline the history and 
current functioning of the federal maternity/parental benefit scheme, describe 
the Quebec Court of Appeal decision and provide a few highlights from the 
Supreme Court reasons. I will close by looking at the question ofwhether and 
how activists concerned with equality for mothers can advance a maternity and 
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parental benefits scheme that truly meets the needs of all. 
Initial attempts by the federal government to enact a national unemploy- 
ment insurance scheme in the 1930s were challenged by the provinces as an 
encroachment on the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. As 
a result a constitutional amendment was negotiated that allowed the introduc- 
tion of a federal unemployment program in 1940. Maternity benefits were 
added in 1971 and were expanded to include 10 weeks of parental benefits in 
1990. In 2001 parental benefits were extended to 35 weeks. It is section 22 that 
provides for the payment of maternity benefits to an eligible woman for a period 
of fifteen weeks surrounding the birth of her child. Section 23 provides for the 
payment of parental benefits for a total of 35 weeks to qualifylng parents of a 
newborn or child placed for adoption. In order to qualify for either of these 
benefits the parent claiming them must have worked at least 600 hours in the 
preceding 52-week period. Under the scheme the benefit payable is 55 percent 
of the recipient's weekly wage to a maximum of $413/week. With benefit levels 
this low many women cannot afford to take a maternity or parental leave. In 
families that can afford a45 percent cut in income it is the lower income earning 
parent who will take the leave and in a heterosexual relationship this is 
predominantly the mother. In fact as recently as 2000, 98 percent of all 
recipients of maternitylparental benefits under the scheme were women? 
Only claimants with sufficient workforce attachment are eligible for 
maternity or parental benefits, thus workers who are self-employed, working 
part-time or on contract, or other contingent workers are excluded from the 
benefit. As a result, more than one third of new mothers do not have access to 
maternity or parental benefits. Halfof these are women who did not engage in 
paidwork, or did not have sufficient hours ofpaidwork, in the qualifylng period 
because of the nature oftheir employment or because they were caring for their 
other ~hi ldren .~  These inequalities are at the root of the many criticisms that 
have been leveled at the scheme over theyears. Various challenges to the scheme 
for its failure to meet women's equality rights have failed at the level of the 
Federal Court of Appeal. For example, in Lesiuk v. Canadd a mother of one 
child challenged the denial of maternity benefits for the birth of her second 
child on the basis that the qualifylng requirement discriminated against her 
because her caregiving responsibilities for her first child affected the number of 
hours she was available to work preceding the birth of her second child. Her 
equality arguments were successful before the Umpire who found that the 
eligibility requirements had a disproportionate impact on individuals with 
childcare responsibilities, predominantly women. The Federal Court of Ap- 
peal struck down that decision on the basis that women's human dignity was 
not demeaned by a denial of benefits. The Federal Court of Appeal employed 
similar logic in Miller v. Canada, a challenge to the claw-back of regular 
benefits where a claimant has received maternity/parental benefits. 
The essence of women's claims relating to the maternity/parental benefit 
scheme is that it was designed to meet the needs of the ideal male worker, one 
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who worked full-time, year round, and who had a partner at home taking care 
of all domestic labour. Because women's working patterns do not mirror those 
of this ideal worker, maternity and parental benefits have fitted poorly into this 
model with the most significant impact on marginalized women who already 
experience the greatest inequalities in the labour force. As Nitya Iyer has 
argued, the existing model reinforces the motherwork of the predominantly 
middle and upper class women who can access maternity benefits while "the 
maternal work of other women workers remains ~rivatized and invisible."' 
In  Quebec, the story has unfolded somewhat differently. Throughout the 
1990s women's groups and organized labour in the province worked with the 
government to develop a broader and richer maternity and parental benefits 
scheme under the opt-out provisions of the federal Employment ImuranceAct. 
This new Quebec model suffered from fewer of the discriminatory problems 
that plague the federal scheme but negotiations between the province and the 
federal government on the cost sharing dragged on for years. Finally, in March 
of 2002 the Quebec government asked the Court of Appeal for Quebec to rule 
on the constitutionality of ss. 22 and 23 of the EmpZoymentInsuranceActt8 The 
Court of Appeal held that the federal government did not have the power to 
provide maternity and parental benefits under the unemployment insurance 
constitutional amendment. The Court held that this amendment was to be 
narrowly construed as relating only to loss of employment for economic 
reasons. Maternity or parental benefits are more properly seen as part of a social 
program aimed at a situation that is personal in nature and therefore properly 
belong within provincial jurisdiction. The Court, echoing the formal equality 
notions of voluntariness that were rejected in Brookr: stated that matters of 
personal choice could not be covered by an insurance scheme that is intended 
to protect against unforeseeable risk 
The decision of the Court of Appeal provoked a great deal of anxiety 
because of the mixed message it sent. On the one hand, the more progressive 
Quebec plan that had been hard won by a broad coalition of community 
activists had been upheld. On the other, a finding that the scheme was outside 
of federal jurisdiction raised serious concerns for the continued availability of 
any maternity/parental benefits elsewhere in Canada. Moreover the regressive 
language of voluntariness and choice was contrary to feminist theorizing about 
gender equality and women's social reproductive work. These tensions created 
an untenable situation for women's groups who might have considered inter- 
vening before the Supreme Court of Canada, as none wanted to be seen to be 
arguing against the accomplishments of our Quebec sisters and yet none 
wanted to lose the national program or leave the formal equality construction 
of women's childbearing work unchallenged. This ambivalence perhaps ex- 
plains the absence of any feminist interveners before the Supreme Court. 
In October 2005, in a decision where a majority ofthe judges were women, 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the maternity/parental 
benefits on two grounds. On  the division ofpowers aspect ofthe case the court 
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held that the maternity/parental benefits were in pith and substance a "mecha- 
nism for providing replacement income during an interruption of work. This 
is consistent with the essence of the federal jurisdiction ... namely the 
establishment ofa public insurance program the purpose ofwhich is to preserve 
workers' economic security and ensure their re-entry into the labour market by 
paying income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of employ- 
ment."" It  did not accept the dichotomy between "economic" and "personal" 
reasons that had been relied upon by the Court of Appeal. The Court also 
rejected the narrow original intent approach of the Court of Appeal although 
it did acknowledge the political elements at play in defining the features of 
federalism and affirmed that the "task of maintaining the balance between 
federal and provincial powers falls primarily to  government^."'^ 
Although it is not explicitly set out, the Court also brought a substantive 
equality approach to this case. Madam Justice Deschamps recognizes that "in 
our times, having a child is often the result of a deliberate act decided on by one 
or both parents. There are many facets to pregnancy however. Despite all the 
technological progress that has been made, conception does not result from a 
mathematical calculation that can be used to determine when or even if it will 
occur. In addition, the benefit derived from procreation extends beyond the 
benefit to the parents. Children are one of society's most important assets, and 
the contribution made by parents cannot be overstated.. . . . The decision to offer 
women the possibility of receiving income replacement benefits when they are 
off work due to pregnancy is therefore a social policy decision that is not 
incompatible with the concept of risk in the realm of insurance, and that can 
moreover be harmoniously incorporated into a public unemployment insur- 
ance plan."'2 This language underlines the benefit society derives from women's 
reproductive labour and the collective responsibility to support women in their 
roles as workers and mothers. It  represents a move away from the privatizing 
approach that is seen in many recent decisions that touch upon social reproduc- 
tion. The decision also seems to recognize that maternity/parental benefits are 
different from regular unemployment benefits because they are designed to 
meet the particular needs ofwomen: "a growing portion of the labour force is 
made up of women, and women have particular needs that are of concern to 
society as a whole. An interruption of employment due to maternity can no 
longer be regarded as a matter of individual responsibility. Women's connec- 
tion to the labour market is well established, and their inclusion in the 
expression "unemployed persons" is as natural an extension as the extension 
involving other classes of insured persons who lose their employment 
income.. ..The social nature of unemployment insurance requires that Parlia- 
ment be able to adapt the plan to the new realities of the workplace. Some 
eligibility requirements derive from the essence of the unemployment concept, 
while other requirements are, rather mechanisms that reflect a social policy 
choice linked to the implementation of the plan."13 
The power of this decision is that it represents the strongest statement of 
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the public, collective responsibility for the work of raising future generations 
since Brooks and it affirms an existing mechanism for providing at least some 
level ofthat public support. The challenge it presents is that many feminists and 
other activists in this area are agreed that maternity and parental benefits are 
best provided outside of the unemployment scheme where they could be 
expanded to cover the many marginalized women who are currently excluded 
from the benefits. The current scheme is still far from meeting the needs ofthe 
- 
most vulnerable women in Canadian society and has significant regressive 
implications even for the more privileged among us. Because women still do the 
bulk of the work of caring for children even when they are employed in paid 
work inequalities in the maternity/parental benefits scheme disadvantage them 
disproportionately compared to men. A full realization of women's equality 
rights requires an adequate maternity/parental benefits scheme. 
The strategic question facing activists now is how to continue to promote 
a broad social program with minimum national standards while advocating 
additions and enhancements to the program that are antithetical to its contin- 
ued existence within the Employment Insurance Act. This is an especially 
pressing concern when the Supreme Court has taken a significant step in the 
direction of equality in a case that reinforces the position of maternity/parental 
benefits within the Act. Should we build on this momentum and lobby for a 
richer, more extensive benefit program along the lines of the Quebec program? 
Or should we be seeking a universal program that would include all mothers 
regardless of their connection with the work force in a way that recognizes the 
inherent value of each one's motherwork. There are numerous proposals for 
reform to the EmploymentInsuranceAct that have been circulated recently, and 
practically speaking, such an incremental approach is probably the correct one. 
It is important to keep our larger, transformative, ideal visions of full equality 
in sight, but as we grapple with this challenge we should not forget to celebrate 
the victory this case represents for women who are struggling to reconcile their 
roles as mothers and workers in contemporary Canadian society. 
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